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HODGKINSON'S PARADOXICAL PARADIGM

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The great issues of the day in education ... are valuational, educational and administrative, and must be approached as such. [Hodgkinson] offers the tools by which these problems may be addressed and resolved.

Thorn Greenfield (1991, p. 6).

Christopher Hodgkinson's four books on the philosophy of administration and leadership present what is probably the most sustained treatment of values in administrative action, theory, and philosophy currently available. As aptly foreshadowed by its title, his third book, *Educational leadership: The moral art* (1991), concentrated on the inescapable role and importance of values in education, and the character and actions of those who decide its form and content, means and ends. Hodgkinson's views on values and education, some of which constitute the analytical tools referred to by Greenfield in the epigraph, are by no means limited to this one volume. Throughout his work, his treatment of the inescapable integration of values with the exercise of power and responsibility speaks to the indissoluble and intimate relationship between these and education.

Hodgkinson's acute awareness of the close, persistent connections between values and education were, at least in part, nurtured by his long work with and through the Faculty of Education at the University of Victoria (Lang, in press). This institutional context contributed to the prominence his work has gained in the field of educational administration, where his name is indelibly associated with his assertion that

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administrators inescapably deal in and arbitrate values. Although, as I hope to show, his attempts at getting to grips with the philosophical and practical implication of this have been hobbled by weaknesses in his analytical machinery, Hodgkinson's contributions have made an undeniably central contribution to the current renaissance of values studies in educational administration, and the growing interest in ethics and morals which is a central part of this renewal (Ashbaugh & Kasten, 1984; Begley, 1999; Greenfield, 1991; Willower & Forsyth, 1999). The key resource that sustains Hodgkinson's anabasis into the realm of values is his "analytical model of the value concept" (1978, p. 110; 1991, p. 97), which he also refers to as his "value paradigm" (1983, p. 38; 1996, p. 114). Hodgkinson claims his paradigm is "philosophically robust" (1996, p. 181), but as discussed by a variety of commentators (*e.g.* Evers, 1985; Evers & Lakomski, 1991; Lobb, 1993; Willower, 1998) it appears quite rickety in several key respects. One major concern has to do with the distinction between values themselves and how they are valued: between conceptions of the desirable and why someone considers a given conception desirable: between values and valuation. As Hodgkinson himself has noted, this produces a paradox in his paradigm (1991, p. 152). Before addressing this directly, some commentary on several keystone claims made by Hodgkinson will help clear the conceptual ground, and in the process uncover a clutch of other paradoxes in his approach.

FACTS AND VALUES

"The world of fact is given, the world of value made" (Hodgkinson, 1978, p. 220; 1996, p. 133). On this basal claim Hodgkinson hangs all of his lore and prophecy about values. The dichotomy he attempts to draw rests on the claim that facts are given to us by the world 'out there'. The very origins of the word do not support such a view, 'fact' coming to us from the Latin *factio*, to make. As his fondness for quoting Wittgenstein, including his "the limits of my language are the limits of my world" illustrate (*e.g.* Hodgkinson, 1991, p. 49), we come to know the world by interpreting what appears to be given through language and theory. Through, as Weber had it, the "perpetual process of reconstruction of those concepts in terms of which we seek to lay hold

of reality" (1949, p. 105), or as Kuhn more recently expressed it, through "the entities with which [a] theory populates nature" (1996, p. 201). As discussed at length by contemporary philosophers of science such as Hacking (1999), Latour (1999) and Pickering (1995), this applies to facts as well as other conceptions. Facts are not given to us like pebbles on a beach, waiting to be picked up, they are constructed by human artifice and artefact. A particularly powerful illustration of this is given in Latour and Woolgar's (1979) *Laboratory life: The social construction of scientific facts*, where the authors report the results of what many in the field of education would call a qualitative study of how Thyrotropin Releasing Factor (Hormone) became a "particularly solid fact" through laboratory inquiries and related social activities (p. 106). Hacking's (1990) brilliant *The taming of chance* provides a perhaps more pertinent example concentrating on the development of modern statistical thinking and the concomitant construction of the social facts which nowadays define normality, and through which policy-makers and administrators 'know' the societies and organizations for which they are responsible. What appear to be invariant (as far as we think we know) regularities commonly referred to as physical laws seem to better reflect Hodgkinson's notion of given facts, but our knowledge about such relationships is nonetheless codified and expressed using human-made concepts. As best we know, for example, light travels at 1.80 tera furlongs per fortnight. Nor are values made in the sense that Hodgkinson claims. This word comes to us, as does valiant, valid, valence, avail and evaluate, from the Latin *valere*, to be strong, sharing an etymological root with the Old English *wealdan*, to rule, and *wieldan*, to govern. Values come to us through the media of human culture *via* the dynamic processes of enculturation, socialization and education which forge our identity and infuse the world with meaning. We may and do choose some values over others, but characteristically and for the most part our values preexist us (Geertz, 1973; Strauss & Quinn, 1997). But while Hodgkinson has continued to cling to the dichotomy he attempts to draw between the ontology of facts and values, one of the paradoxes in his work is his growing recognition of the salience of sociocultural values. In his first book the focus was firmly on values as internal and, to a lesser degree, organizational phenomena with only passing reference to "extra-organizational

cultural values" (1978, p. 131). In contrast, his latest book offers and uses a well worked out typology of layers of value, the development of which can be traced through the two intervening volumes. Two versions of the model are actually presented in the latest book. The first, aptly entitled "The Administrative Value Field", is, as Hodgkinson makes clear in the accompanying text, an "extension and modification" of the venerable Getzels-Guba delineation of nomothetic (formal role expectations) and idiographic (individual personality) fields of expectations and action in organizations supplemented with the layers of impressed values discussed below (Hodgkinson, 1996, pgs. 44-6). This analytical frame is a genuine advance on Getzels-Guba that deserves to be widely noticed and used. The second version, entitled "The Field of Value Impress", deals more explicitly with four "broad levels of value" external to individuals (Hodgkinson, 1996, p. 151). Hodgkinson names and indexes these layers of sociocultural values as follows: V5 = Cultural ethos and Zeitgeist, V4 = Local and subcultural interpretation, V3 = Organizational values, V2 = Peer group values (encompassing the informal organization), and V1 = Individual. But while Hodgkinson recognizes and accepts these successively enfolding layers of value, and while he acknowledges values at higher levels are impressed on lower levels and their human constituents, he remains paradoxically reluctant to accept both the formative effect and the objective status of sociocultural values to anything like the extent to which they are viewed in contemporary cultural realist and social constructivist approaches, clinging to his contention that values are made, not given.

As we have seen, it is more the case that facts are made and values given. By itself this reversal need not do serious harm to Hodgkinson's broader interests in the philosophy of administration if we proceed by agreeing with him that facts and values are inextricably interwoven in sociocultural reality, and thus the fabric of life in organizations and the responsibilities of administrators. Even so, the socially constructed nature of facts provides the ammunition to blow many of his proscriptions about science out of the water, a point not at issue here. More importantly for the current argument, his reluctance to more fully accept the implications of what he recognizes as the sociocultural impress of values

sows the seeds of the paradox that bedevils his value paradigm.

FALLACIES AND FANCIES

Hodgkinson warns against committing various value fallacies, chief among which is the naturalistic fallacy. But as Colin Evers (1985) pointed out, Hodgkinson paradoxically conflates Moore's original account of this fallacy, which is the error of assuming good can be defined as if it were a simple natural property, with Hume's earlier stricture against getting an 'ought' from an 'is'. Hodgkinson adverts to both transgressions in all four volumes of his 'Victorian Quartet', but concentrates on the sin of Getting Ought From Is [GOFI], sternly warning that administrators "must beware of the temptation to derive their subjectivities ('oughts') from their objectivities ('is's')" (1996, p. 124). For Hodgkinson this is more than faulty logic: it amounts to a typing error which results in values being improperly derived from facts (*e.g.* 1978, p. 106; 1991, p. 90). Yet despite vigorous preaching of the GOFI doctrine by various proponents in addition to Hodgkinson, it has been demonstrated that we can indeed get to ought from is (*e.g.* Arrington, 1989; Evers & Lakomski, 1991, Ch. 8). We do not need to look into these logical arguments here as the essence of the matter as it unfolds in social, and thus administrative and educational contexts, is captured in Mark Holmes' (1986, p. 85) straightforward challenge to Hodgkinson: "She is a teacher of 7-year olds in our local schools; therefore she should teach them to read." Hodgkinson's response is revealing. "The value premises in [Holmes'] example are there prior to the definition of teacher; . . . Once the values are set then one can, *of course, appear to* derive values from the value-loaded fact . . ." (emphasis added, Hodgkinson, 1991, p. 90). Indeed we can—but there is no 'appear to' about it. The meanings with which cultures infuse language ensure that nominative and descriptive terms will be saturated with value. Common, everyday conversation is replete with examples, especially in organizations. We can plausibly expand on Holmes' example by pointing out whoever *is* the school principal *ought* to do "all that is prudent, possible and permitted to ensure" Holmes' teacher teaches her students to read (Allison & Ellett, 1998, p. 198). What is more, we can readily imagine that if she *is* not compliant, the talk among parents

and other teachers will be that she *should* do what is expected. Such expectations are embedded in our shared expectations for role incumbents: she *is* a mother; she *ought* to care for her child. He *is* a manager; he *ought* to possess requisite technical expertise. She *is* an administrator; she *ought* to provide (appropriate) leadership. And so on and so forth. Hodgkinson's model of layers of value impress readily accommodate this, but he paradoxically tries to duck the implications for his fact/value and is/ought dichotomies by arguing common concepts such as 'teacher' will bear "different value connotations from culture to culture and from time to time" (1991, p. 91). True enough, but this is a red herring as each of us lives and has our being in—and each administrator and teacher must decide and act within—a single culture complex at a single time. It is also the case, of course, that the normative conclusions people reach from their interpretations of everyday events and circumstances can obviously not be taken as categorical or universal: they will always be contingent on the context within the culture. But this is precisely the domain in which administrators (and the rest of us) are located. In consequence, administrators who heed Hodgkinson's advice and cling to the GOFI doctrine will be denying the validity of everyday value discourse in their organization which he, paradoxically, does not want them to do.

PARADIGM AND PARADOX

Hodgkinson's value paradigm is a typology derived from the four (and only four) grounds on which Hodgkinson claims values can be justified by those who hold them (1982, p.37; 1991, p. 98). As he puts it in his latest book, "We can establish or ground our values in one these four ways and upon these four bases only" (1996, p. 117). The paradox that is embedded in his paradigm arises from the uncertain identity of "we" and "our" in this claim. Does this refer to individuals or collectivities, such as organizations? To maintain consistency with his overall approach, particularly his model of values impress, and to ensure coherence with other widely acceptable analytical approaches, such as those developed by Barnard, Geertz, Greenfield, Kuhn, and Weber, for example, the answer can only be individuals. As Hodgkinson clearly acknowledges and accepts, organizations and other social collectivities can not value. Their leaders, their decision making

bodies—boards, senates, committees—can of course proclaim or otherwise establish that an organization will uphold, enshrine, respect, embody such and such conceptions of the desirable, but this will be an empty formality unless the people that are the organization come themselves to value them. Hodgkinson's paradigm addresses the grounds on which individuals may do this, or come to accept other values, perhaps contrary to those that are officially sanctioned in some way.

Within the paradigm, Type III values are simple, idiosyncratic, self-justifying preferences for what is believed to be 'good' by an individual: what he or she desires. I prefer scotch, my wife prefers port, and that is all that can be said on the matter as there is no accounting for tastes (Hodgkinson, 1996, p. 117). His remaining value types are justified with reference to conceptions of what is 'right' rather than 'good' in this hedonistic sense: the desirable rather than the desired (1996, p. 116). Type II values are justified on rational grounds, two sub-types being recognized: Type IIb values, where what is right is determined by social consensus or some aggregation of views, as through a legislative process or with reference to social norms and conventions. Type IIa values are justified through rational calculation of some kind, such as cost-benefit analysis. Both kinds of Type II values assume a social context within which heads can be counted, individual preferences aggregated (IIb), or expected consequences (IIa) assessed with reference to "a given scheme of social norms, expectations, and standards" (1996, p. 117). Type I values are "the ultimate level of value . . . [they] are transrational; they go beyond reason. They imply instead an act of faith or intent or will—a *conviction* manifested in the acceptance of a *principle*" (emphasis in original, 1996, p. 118). In addition to an implicitly assumed social context, Type I values have a metaphysical dimension and a "quality of absoluteness" (1996, p. 118): "They are often codified into religious systems . . . or . . . political ideologies" (1996, p. 120). In his accompanying postulate of hierarchy, Hodgkinson declares, without argument, that "Type I values are superior, more authentic, better justified, and of more defensible grounding than Type II. Likewise, Type II are superior to Type III" (1978, p. 116; 1996, p. 121). This is a remarkable claim for in addition to stipulating levels of justification and authenticity,

it appears as if values are themselves being ranked, introducing the ontological paradox that haunts the paradigm and bedevils Hodgkinson's use of it as an analytical tool.

Before addressing this directly, notice can be taken of several other problems with the paradigm. First, by limiting conceptions of good to Type III values the paradigm lacks the resources to differentiate between good and evil in any context other than that of hedonistic preference. The typology is thus powerless with regard to what might count, for example, as a good education or the good exercise of leadership by an administrator. Whatever is preferred at the Type III level is by definition 'good', and whatever is chosen by reason or force of will at levels II and I respectively is 'right', but only for the person making these choices. Hodgkinson tries to get around these problems by allowing Type II and I valuation to embrace normative standards and moral codes, but this does not help because mere recognition of the social, moral, and philosophical content of values that are valued by Type II and I valuation does not allow analysis of the relative moral worth of the values themselves. What is good or right for Hodgkinson's chooser may well be condemned as evil by others. Ironically, by equating good with innumerable individual preferences, the model also condemns us to endlessly committing the naturalistic fallacy as originally propounded by Moore, which is another paradox given Hodgkinson's warnings about this sin. As defined by Moore, the naturalistic fallacy is committed when one attempts to define 'good' with reference to some natural object or state. As Walter Lobb (1993) pointed out, we end up doing this with Type III values as follows: If and only if Chris prefers tea, then tea is good. Chris does prefer tea. Tea is therefore good. But according to Moore this must be fallacious because there are more things than tea that are good, as can be readily demonstrated by asking 'is tea all that is good?'

One of the more obvious problems with the paradigm is how 'subrational' Type III values of Preference are to be reliably differentiated from 'transrational' Type I values of Principle. Both are by definition non-rational and, as Hodgkinson says, "Type I values are Type III values writ large" (1996, p. 211). His most direct answer to this typing problem appeared in an article responding to Evers' (1985) original criticisms. Here he abstracts and makes more

explicit key psychological "correspondences" or "faculties" incorporated into the schematic presentations of the value paradigm in his books, these being emotion and affect at level III, reason and cognition at level II and will and conation at level I. In accord with his postulate of hierarchy, this is summarized as Will > Reason > Emotion: "So long as the faculty of will can be discriminated from the faculty of emotion then the paradigm holds" declares Hodgkinson (1986, p. 14). This drives home the dynamic of individual choice underlying the model, with value status being set by the grounds on which an individual is considered to hold a particular value. The key analytical question in Hodgkinson's scheme is thus why someone holds a given value: is it a case of emotion, reason or will? Because this can change, an individual's values can be transmuted, mutated, transvalued: what was initially an emotional preference for some valued state can modulate into reasoned justification or be transformed into a transcendental commitment and *vice versa*. Hodgkinson's value paradigm is thus very much concerned with motivation, as he acknowledges through his various discussion of parallels between his paradigm and the theories of Maslow and Herzberg (e.g. 1978, pgs. 117-120; 1996, pgs. 129-131). Indeed, it often seems to work better as a theory of motivation than value.

In his most recent book, Hodgkinson compares his typology to Weber's constructs of instrumental and value rationality, concluding "the Weberian interpretation is supportive of the value paradigm as given" (1996, p. 132). These constructs form part of Weber's broader typology of social action which also recognizes affectual and traditional (habitual) bases for social behaviour. The affectual maps onto Hodgkinson's Type III level of preference. Action and orientation to action based on habit is not directly recognized in Hodgkinson's paradigm, but given that much of such behaviour flows from conformity with social and cultural conventions in Weber's analysis, it seems very similar to Hodgkinson's Ib type of value attachment. Contrary to Hodgkinson's interpretation, his Type I value commitment looks very similar to Weber's value rationality, where action is described as being "determined by a *conscious belief* in the value for its own sake of some ethical, aesthetic, religious or some other form of behavior, independently of its

prospects for success" (emphasis added, Weber, 1978, p. 25). Pulling this together, Type III value attachment maps onto Weber's affectual bases for social action, Type IIb Weber's traditional/habitual bases, Type IIa is Weber's instrumental rationality (*zweckrational*), and Type I value commitment Weber's value rationality (*wertrational*).

THE PARADIGMATIC FALLACY

As noted earlier, Hodgkinson sometimes refers to Type I, II, and III values as if the hierarchy of superiority was somehow inherent in the values themselves. Indeed, when outlining his homogenetic fallacy he explicitly claims "values are themselves amenable to hierarchical analysis" (1996, p. 124), although the examples he gives to illustrate this rest on different levels at which individuals subscribe to similar values, as is required by his paradigm. A particularly intriguing case occurs in a discussion of the 'moral character' of organizations where Hodgkinson asks "Is the organization, say, elitist (Type I), productive (IIA), politically correct (IIB), hedonic (III)" (1996, p. 169). Here Hodgkinson appears to be classifying organizational cultures according to differences inherent in values themselves. But how can political correctness, for example, be a Type I value? As we all know from personal experience, some individuals can most definitely subscribe to such values at the Type I level, and presumably an organization staffed entirely by such people would be characterized by shared normative commitments at this level. But what are the implications for the organizational culture if some (many) members of the organization only subscribe to such values at the II or even III level? Obviously the official culture as proclaimed in mission and vision statements and the like could formally commit the organization to a politically correct value set. But, as we noted earlier and as Hodgkinson takes pains to point out, organizations can not value: only people can (*e.g.* 1996, p. 176). As he presents it, Hodgkinson's value paradigm only allows for Type I preference or Type II or III commitment *by* individuals *to* whatever values they choose. In the examples given and elsewhere, Hodgkinson appears to commit what we might call the paradigmatic fallacy of assigning hierarchical levels to values independent of a valuing agent.

In any event, we are left with the reality of organizational (V3), social (V4) and cultural values (V5). These are values that exist in the sociocultural world and can be known objectively but are not necessarily subscribed to by any given individual at any level in the paradigm. Hodgkinson clearly accepts the reality of such values in his levels of values impress schema as discussed above. His four organizational metavalues of maintenance, growth, effectiveness and efficiency are also described as applying to collectivities not individuals. He acknowledges the problem that arises by recognizing the following paradox:

While the individual alone has the only real *experience* of value and in the end the individual alone, by force of will or force of preference, has the sole *capacity* to take value action yet this individual is the constant recipient of value-determining forces beyond his control or beyond his ken.

Hodgkinson (emphasis in original, 1996, p. 153) This is more than just a curiosity: it points to a fundamental limitation in Hodgkinson's approach. The important point, as he readily acknowledges, is that values can be and are determined in ways that do not depend on individual emotion, reason or will. As Hodgkinson says, the cultural "value impress is inexorable and inescapable" and "organizations are always culturally determined" (1996, p. 153). Administrators, as hierarchically superordinate framers of policy, forgers of purpose and coordinators of the general interest in all its complexity are in a position and have the power to vest their organization with value by their actions and inactions.

ENVOI

Hodgkinson gets a great deal of mileage out of his value paradigm, using it to construct a range of additional analytical models and deconstruct various administrative scenarios in his books. He seems to press it into service at every possible juncture, as well as some impossible ones. In this respect he appears to have an authentic Type I commitment to the paradigm which perhaps encourages him to overlook, downplay, ignore or devalue the import of the paradox that gives rise to the paradigmatic fallacy. Hodgkinson's value paradigm is, as Greenfield suggested, a useful analytical tool, but we must be careful not to misapply it. Just as the Weberian

typology which it approximates gives us a typology of why individuals act in social contexts—on the basis of habit, affect, value rational commitment or instrumentally rational analysis—Hodgkinson's value paradigm gives us a typology of how individuals justify the values they hold or profess—on the grounds of emotion, reason or will. Despite his claims to the contrary, it can tell us nothing about the relative 'superiority' or worth of the values themselves, just as Weber's typology tells us nothing about the relative worth of social action based on habit, emotion, belief or analysis. What both can do, and do well, is help us systematically understand, interpret, compare, and analyse the actions and beliefs of individuals. As such they give us ways to see why people do what they do, say what they say, value what they value. This is by no means insignificant, especially when the people and their actions (or inactions) we seek to better understand have the power to importantly affect the lives of others, either directly or through the sense of meaning and purpose they instil in collective, cooperative endeavours through the values they profess and promote, as in the case of (educational) administrators.

Barnard, one of Hodgkinson's heroes, recovered an ancient truth when he observed "Organizations endure, however, in proportion to the breadth of the morality by which they are governed" (1938, p. 282). Hodgkinson very much agrees with the essence of this, stating in his latest book, for example, that "insofar as organizations are moral orders the values of their leadership make them so" (1996, p. 177). This is most particularly the case, and probably of the greatest practical and social importance, in educational organizations—in classrooms, schools, school districts, provincial, state and national school systems, colleges and universities. As Greenfield observed, the great issues in education are indeed valuational, educational and administrative. And Hodgkinson has indeed helped forge tools which can help us better understand and address these issues. His value paradigm is one of them, but we must be careful to apply it appropriately, within its limitations, at a Type IIa level of engagement rather than Type I. We should also remember that although Hodgkinson's value paradigm appears to have attracted by far the greatest amount of attention in the literature, he has also given us a wealth of other observations, insights and

analytical tools in his valuable work. In this respect his model of the administrative values field which melds his levels of value impress with his extension of the Getzels-Guba model (Hodgkinson, 1996, p. 45) may well turnout to be a more robust and powerful analytical tool than his paradoxical paradigm.

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